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ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE: IS IT TIME FOR
A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the recent decision of Board of Estimate of City of New York
v. Morris,' the United States Supreme Court invalidated the city charter
of New York, ruling that it was unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. 2 The Board of Estimate, a
legislative body, violated the "one person, one vote" rule created by the
landmark decision of Reynolds v. Sims.3 The rule, extrapolated from the
equal protection clause, mandates that all elected bodies exercising
legislative powers must be apportioned on the basis of population. 4 The
Board of Estimate, which gave one vote to Brooklyn, the city's most
populous borough, and one to Staten Island, the least populous, failed to
pass constitutional muster under this simplistic test.5 In light of past
cases, the Court's decision was not found as surprising.6
The Board of Estimate ruling brings into focus the basic flaws of
the "one person, one vote" rule in its expansion of the equal protection
clause's meaning and in its application when compared to the traditional
three tier analysis of equal protection cases. 7 This Note will give a brief
history of the rule in case law, culminating in the Board of Estimate
1. 489 U.S. 688 (1989). The case was originally brought before the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York in 1982 by Beverly Morris, Joy
Clarke Holmes and Joanne Oplustil, three registered voters of the borough of Brooklyn.
See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 551 F. Supp. 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
2. Board of Estimate, 489 U.S. at 690.
3. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4. Id. at 568; see also Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 734-37
(1964).
5. See Board of Estimate, 489 U.S. at 690 n.2, 692.
6. See generally Fox, High Court Voids Boardof Estimate Composition, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 23, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
7. For a recent statement of the Court's three tier analysis of equal protection cases,
see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1988) (under the
first tier of analysis, applicable to most classifications, legislation is presumed valid if
the classification is rationally related to a legitimate government interest; under the
second tier analysis, applicable to gender based classifications, legislation will be upheld
if it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest; and under
the third tier of analysis, applicable to race classifications, legislation is subject to strict
scrutiny and will be sustained only if it is suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest).
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decision. The interpretive problems of the rule will then be discussed and
possible solutions given. Special regard will be given to the way in which
the "one vote" rule infringes upon the rights of minorities, upon basic
ideas of democracy and upon the dying concept of federalism.
II. ORIGINS OF THE RULE

Originally, the Supreme Court had a "hands off' attitude towards
apportionment controversies, viewing them as non-justiciable issues.'
Apportionment controversies were considered political problems best left
to the legislative branch.' When faced with such a controversy in
Colegrove v. Green,'0 the Court stated that "this [apportionment]
controversy concerns matters that bring courts into immediate and active
relations with party contests. From the determination of such issues this
Court has traditionally remained aloof. It is hostile to a democratic
system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.""
Despite such strong statements about the idea of intrusion into the
area of everyday politics and political questions, less than twenty years
-after Colegrove the Court reversed its policy in Baker v. Carr.12 The
Baker case involved a claim that the Tennessee General Assembly, which
had not been reapportioned since 1901, violated appellants' right to equal
protection of law. 13 Subsequent shifts in population left some areas with
8. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553 (1946).
9. Id. at 554. The Court in Colegrove held that questions of apportionment in
congressional districts were expressly left to Congress to decide. Id. "[Dlue regard for
the Constitution as a viable system precludes judicial correction. . . . Article I, see. 4
of the Constitution provides that 'The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for ...Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations .....
Id.
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, ci. 1).
10. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
11. Id. at 553-54. The Court reasoned that to decide that an apportionment scheme
was invalid would be an invasion of the arena of politics from which the courts were
supposed to be insulated. Id. at 552-53. The Court further noted that to hold on such
an issue would be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 556. "To
sustain this action would cut very deep into the very being of Congress." Id.
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1962), rev'g 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
13. Id. at 187-88. Petitioners contended "that the 1901 statute, even as of the time
of its passage, 'made no apportionment of Representatives and Senators in accordance
with the constitutional formula ....but instead arbitrarily and capriciously apportioned
representatives . . . without reference . . . to any logical or reasonable formula
whatever."' Id. at 192.
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many more people but only the same amount of representatives in the
legislature."' The lower courts dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction citing the Colegrove case. 5 The Supreme Court, in a
dramatic turnabout, signalled its decision to enter the area of politics
stating that "this challenge to an apportionment presents no nonjusticiable
'political question."' 16
The Court went on to give approval to the equal protection theory
that the appellants had brought. "Judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open
to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine,
...[that] a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and
capricious action." 7 The Court further concluded that "the complaint's
allegations of a denial of equal protection present a justiciable
constitutional cause of action upon which appellants are entitled to a trial
and a decision."i Because the Court's decision remanded the case to
the lower courts for trial, there was no reason to reach the merits of
appellant's claim. 9 The Court's decision on such an issue would have
to wait.

The landmark decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 2' which came two
years after Baker, contains the definitive statement of the Court
concerning apportionment and the fourteenth amendment. In this case,
the Court revealed the extent of its expansion of the equal protection
clause and outlined the method of judicial scrutiny that would
14. Id. at 192-93.
Between 1901 and 1961, Tennesseehas
experienced substantial growth and redistribution
of her population. In 1901 the population was
2,020,616, of whom 487,380 were eligible to
vote. The 1960 Federal Census reports the
State's population at 3,567,089, of whom
2,092,891 are eligible to vote. The relative
standings of the counties in terms of qualified
voters have changed significantly.
Id. at 192 (citations omitted).
15. Baker v.Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
16. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209. The Court further stated that "the mere fact that the
suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a political question."
Id.
17. Id. at 226 (emphasis in original).
18. Id. at 237.
19. Id.
20. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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subsequently govern such questions up to the present day. 2
The Reynolds case involved a claim by Alabama voters, which
alleged underrepresentation of certain counties in the state legislature.'
The Alabama State Legislature had not been re-apportioned since a 1900
census.' The appellants claimed that population growth within their
counties devalued their voting power in relation to other counties whose
population had not grown; all the counties still maintained the same voting
power.' The appellants claimed that this devaluation of their voting
power represented discrimination in violation of their right to equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment.' The Court agreed with the
appellants, finding that the lack of population-reflective apportionment
between the counties in the Alabama Legislature represented invidious
discrimination in violation of the Constitution. ' Examining the equal
protection claim, the Court stated:
[A]s a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection
Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a
population basis. [An] individual's right to vote . . . is
unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is ...diluted

when compared with votes of citizens living in other
parts of the State.27
Taking hold of the equal protection clause, the Court expanded its
meaning from one of protection from arbitrary discrimination to one
which includes a constitutional imperative of population-based
21. Id. at 568. The decision in Reynolds states that "the Equal Protection Clause
requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned
on a population basis." id.
22. Id. at 536-40. According to the 1901 apportionment plan each of the state's 67
counties and senatorial districts were entitled to at least one representative and one
senator respectively. Id.
23. Id. at 540.
24. Id.
25. Id. "The complaint asserted that plaintiffs had no other adequate remedy, and
that they had exhausted all forms of relief other than that available through the federal
courts. They alleged that the Alabama Legislature had established a pattern of prolonged
inaction from 1911 to the present which 'clearly demonstrates that no reapportionment
* . .shall be effected ....
.. d.
26. Id. at 568-69.
27. Id. at 568.
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representation in legislative bodies.' This represented a great leap of
interpretation by the Court. The Court took a tool for the protection of
persons from discrimination, whether arbitrary or based on race or
national origin,"' and manipulated it to protect political views on promajoritarian democratic theory.'
The Court stated that the "Equal
Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal
representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races.""
However, the rule is still majoritarian in that it does not proscribe
apportionment that reflects arbitrary or racist discrimination, but that
apportionment be predicated solely on the basis of population.32
In implementing this new constitutional principle, the Court went
on to set guidelines or methods of examination for determining when this
principle has been abrogated.33 "Population is, of necessity, the starting
point . . . and the controlling criterion for judgment in legislative
apportionment controversies."' The Court was also quick to point out
that "people, not land or trees or pastures, vote."" Population was
made the controlling factor in deciding when the equal protection clause
has been violated in apportionment controversies. It is at this point that
the Court faced the obvious problems with making the population the
controlling factor. "[I]t is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative
districts so that each one has an identical number of residents ...
Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional
28. The equal protection clause has traditionally been interpreted by the Court as
protecting persons from actions by the government that are discriminatory where the
discrimination "[r]eflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action." Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) (emphasis in original).
29. See supra note 7 for discussion of equal protection analysis.
30. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576.
31. Id. at 568.
32. See supra note 21.
33. Id. at 568-69. The Court employed a "population variance ratio test" which
compared the populations and representation that each area had to determine what
percentage of the population had what percentage of the votes in the legislature. Id. at
545-51. Under this test, it was found that only 25.1% of the population of the state
lived in areas that elected a majority of the seats in the state legislature. Id.
34. Id. at 567. The Court was, in effect, advocating the use of a mathematical
population-based representation theory. Id. at 567-68.
35. Id. at 580.
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requirement. "'

Despite their own statements acknowledging the weakness of
making population and mathematics the controlling factors for this new
rule, the majority in Reynolds went on to discourage the use of a great
deal of other types of interests. "[N]either history alone, nor economic
or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors .

.

. ."' While

the Court recognized that preserving political subdivisions is a permissible
state interest, population is given precedence over it, with any substantial
deviation from population interests rendering the apportionment
unconstitutional."8
III. EXPANSION OF THE RULE

The most substantial effect of Reynolds is that it announced an
expansion of a principle that the Constitution mandated population-based
representation, discouraging the representation of other important
interests. 39 The Court was clearly invading areas of political discretion,
most notably, that of federalism. The Court's intrusion into the area of
states' rights and political decisions is clearly exhibited by the decision in
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly.' ° In Lucas, the Court struck
down a representation scheme of the Colorado state legislature which had
been approved by state referendum.41 The Colorado scheme was not
purely population based.42 The Colorado plan provided for two houses,
one which was population-based and one which had representatives of the
36. Id. at 577. "By holding that ... both houses of a state legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis, we mean... that a State [must] make an honest and
good faith effort to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is
practicable." Id.

37. Id. at 579-80 (footnote omitted).

The Court dismissed geographical

considerations as unimportant in light of the advancements in the areas of transportation
and communications. Id. However, the Court offered little justification for dismissing
these interests beyond that reasoning and failed to address the question of why historical
and economic interests were unimportant.
38. See generally id. at 581.
39. See generally Note, Reapportionment: A Call for a Consistent Quantitative
Standard, 70 IowA L. REV. 663 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Call for Consistent
Quantitative Standard].
40. 377 U.S. 713 (1963) (the Lucas decision was handed down simultaneously with
the Reynolds decision).
41. Id. at 737-39.
42. Id. at 717-18.
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same number for given areas of unequal population, similar to the United
States Senate.' Striking down this scheme, the Court, in effect, denied
the majority of the State of Colorado the representational system that they
considered the best reflection of their interests." A clearer example of
judicial invasion into a state's discretion, and into the rights of the people
to establish the form of government best suited to their needs, can hardly
be imagined.'
Despite the Court's recognition of the danger of establishing a
rule of mathematical exactness this is exactly the type of rule that the
Reynolds case has inspired.' The "nearly as practicable test" became
the standard rule of such controversies and was strictly construed in
subsequent cases."7 "De minimus deviations are unavoidable," the Court
stated in Swann v. Adams.' However, in the same case the Court
required that "variations from a pure population standard ... be justified
"..

The Court in Swann then went on to examine the percentage

of deviations, applying a mathematical examination for apportionment,
while at the same time maintaining that such "'exactness . . . is not
required.'""
Later cases further increased the stringent nature of the rule. In
the case of Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,5' the Court held that any deviation
from population based representation by a legislature must be justified "no
43. Id. at 718. Under the Colorado plan the seats in the state Senate were
apportioned on the basis of geographical considerations and a number of other factors,
one of which was a population-based factor. Id. However, a ratio system did not allow
districts of very large population a significantly larger number of senators. Id. at 717-18
n.4.
44. Id. at 717. In the 1962 Colorado general elections, the voters of that state, in
a referendum vote, adopted the non-population plan by an almost 2-1 margin and
defeated a proposal to change the apportionment as well. Id.
45. See Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 441-43 (1966) (Florida State Legislature
required to reapportion three times).
46. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
47. See, e.g., Swann, 385 U.S. at 444; see also Note, Call for Consistent
Quantitative Standard,supra note 39, at 668-70.
48. Swann, 385 U.S. at 444.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 443 (quoting the district court opinion, Swann v. Adams, 258 F. Supp.
819, 826-27 (1965)). The Court examined the statistics and concluded that there was a
"deviation of more than 10% in districts which elect 29 of the 117 representatives;
24.35% of the State's population lives in these districts." Id.
51. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
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matter how small." 2 "The Court expressly rejected several of the state's
proffered reasons for the population deviations, including state's interests
in (1) preserving areas with distinct 'interest orientations'; (2)
accommodating 'partisan politics,' including the inhibition of partisan
gerrymandering; (3) avoiding the fragmentation of political subdivisions;
and (4) creating 'compact' districts." 53
Despite the sweeping scope of the justifications that were
disallowed under Kirkpatrick, the Court, in the subsequent case of Mahan
v. Howell,' ruled that preserving political subdivisions was a permissible
justification for deviation from pure population based representation. 55
In addition, the Court explicitly acknowledged that it was applying a
"mathematical standard" in the case at bar and in previous cases in order
to determine when deviations were acceptable.56
IV. ADOPTION OF DIFFERENT LEVELS OF EXAMINATION:
FEDERAL V. STATE

The decisions of the Court began to split along the lines of federal
apportionment controversies and state controversies. Congressional cases
had to comply with the strict Kirkpatrick rule, while "minor deviations
from mathematical equality among state legislative districts . . . ," were
held as insufficient "to require justification by the State." 57 In a
congressional apportionment case decided in this same period, the Court
invalidated a districting scheme that had a representational percentage
difference between districts of only 4.13%. 5' The rule remains strict in
congressional cases. 9 The evolution of the "one person, one vote" rule
with regard to apportionment controversies within states, however, has
52. Id. at 531.
53. Note, Callfor Consistent Quantitative Standard,supra note 39, at 670 (quoting
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533-36).
54. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
55. Id. at 328.
56. Id.
57. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1972); see also Note, Call for
Consistent Quantitative Standard, supra note 39, at 672.
58. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 784-85 (1972).
59. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1982) (deviation of
representation of less than 1 % between congressional districts held invalid under "one
person, one vote" rule).
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continued to evolve.'
In Brown v. ThonTpson,61 the Court once again addressed the
question of the claimed dilution from an apportionment controversy in a
state legislature.'
This case involved the Wyoming State Legislature
which had a maximum deviation in representation between districts of
89%.' The Court held that the deviation, which was justified on the
basis of preserving political subdivisions, was constitutional.' 4 In so
doing, the Court ignored the method of examination that it had laid down
for itself in Mahan and Kirkpatrick. The Court left behind its test that
any deviation from population based apportionment should be "based on
legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state
policy"' and whether "the population disparities . . . that have resulted
from . . . this plan [or interest] exceed constitutional limits."'
The application of the rule in previous cases of state
apportionment schemes had allowed a deviation from population based
representation where the state had a permissible purpose.67 The question
the Court asked now was whether the deviation itself exceeded any
constitutional limits." To decide when the so -called "limits" had been
exceeded, the Court applied a "mathematical standard."' In Brown, on
the other hand, the Court expressly eschewed the mathematical
standard.' "The issue therefore is not whether a 16% average deviation
and an 89% maximum deviation, considering the state apportionment plan
as a whole, are constitutionally permissible. Rather, the issue is whether
60. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835"(1983) (upholding Wyoming
policy of using counties as representative districts and ensuring each county has one
representative); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (fourteenth amendment
forbids election of local government officials from districts of substantially unequal
population).
61. 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
62. Id.at 838-40.
63. Id.at 846. The Court stated that the issue was "whether Wyoming's policy of
preserving county boundaries justifies the... deviations from population equality...
. Id.
64. Id. at 846-48.
65. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 325 (1973) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
66. Id.at 328.
67. Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 846-48 (1983).
68. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 328.
69. Id.
70. See generally Brown, 462 U.S. at 846.
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Wyoming's policy of preserving county boundaries justifies the . . .
deviations from population equality ....
7'
At the same time that the Court was applying this new
examination, which did not rely on previous cases, the majority opinion
stated that it was, in fact, applying the "constitutional limit" mathematical
examination as set down in Swann and Mahan. 2 While Justice Powell,
who wrote the majority opinion in Brown, claimed to be adopting a
traditional test, he was, in fact, embarking on an entirely new theory of
judicial examination. '

V.

FURTHER EXPANSION OF THE RULE TO STATE SUBDIVISIONS

While the "one person, one vote" rule was developing with regard
to the state legislature, the Supreme Court also began to lengthen the
reach of the rule to legislative bodies within political subdivisions of
states. 74 The foremost case in this area is Avery v. Midland County.75
The Avery case involved a claim by residents of Midland County, Texas,
who alleged that the apportionment of the county government was
unconstitutional in that it denied them equal protection of the law under
the fourteenth amendment.76 The Midland County government, called
the Commissioners Court, consisted of one judge, elected by the county
at large, and four commissioners, elected by their districts. ' Although
each district had one vote, a great disparity existed in population among
the districts.
In Avery, the Court held that the Midland County government

71. Id. at 846.
72. Id. at 843. The Court in Brown even goes so far as quoting the Mahan
decision, stating that "[tihe ultimate inquiry, therefore, is whether the legislature's plan
'may reasonably be said to advance [a]rational state policy' and, if so, 'whether the
population disparities among the district that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan
exceed constitutional limits." Id. (quoting Mahan, 410 U.S. at 328).
73. Brown, 462 U.S. at 842-48.
74. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
75. Id.
76. Id.at 475-76.
77. Id.at 476.
78. Id. One district had a population of 67,906 while the other three had
populations of 852, 414, and 828 respectively; each had only one representative in the
local government. Id. "This vast imbalance resulted from placing in a single district
virtually the entire city of Midland, Midland County's only urban center, in which 95%
of the county's population resides." Id.
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violated the "one person, one vote" rule, stating that "local government
.. . must insure that those qualified to vote have the right to an equally
effective voice in the election process."79 Once again the Court imposed
the strict population-based representation rule, this time on the local
government level.' The majority went on to state "that the Constitution
permits no substantial variation from equal population in . . . local
government .... "1
While imposing this strict rule, the Court simultaneously
recognized the danger of the precedent of its decision interfering with the
fragile and unique local governments in all fifty states.'
This Court is aware of the immense pressures
facing units of local government, and of the greatly
varying problems with which they must deal.
The
Constitution does not require that a uniform straitjacket
bind citizens in devising mechanisms of local government
suitable for local needs and efficient in solving local
problems.'s
In this language, it appears as if the Court was willing to tolerate
apportionment in local governments that was not population based. The
Avery decision recognizes the compelling needs and problems of local
government and the difficulties that they would face if limited by the
"straightjacket" of the "one person, one vote" rule.' This, however,
was merely dicta, while the holding of the case left a more accurate
statement of the decision's effect. Avery was the Court's declaration of
"open season" on all units of legislative government, no matter how
small. The decision was, in the words of Justice Harlan, "unjustifiable
and ill-advised. " 85
In addition to showing the Court's willingness to apply the "one
79. Id. at 480.
80. Id. at 478-79.
81. Id. at 484-85.
82. Id. at 485.
83. id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 487 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan called the majority decision
an "adventure in the realm of political science." Id. Justice Harlan pointed to "the ease
with which the Court has proceeded to fasten upon the entire country at its lowest
political levels the strong arm of the federal judiciary." Id. at 490.
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person, one vote" rule to even the lowest levels of state governments, the

Avery case signalled, once again, the foray of the Court into the areas of
states' rights and democratic discretion, since local governments are a
product of state legislatures." The Court is again denying the majority
of a state the type of local government it feels would be most effective. 7
Essentially the Court was intruding into the "realm of political

science," 88 straying far from its function as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution." Justice Harlan touched upon this intrusion but did not
explore it deeply enough.'
He stated that "this decision . . . wholly
disregards statutory limitations upon the. . . jurisdiction of this Court in

state cases

....

.

VI. APPLICATION OF THE RULE TO THE REPRESENTATION OF
RACIAL MINORITIES

By the time the Brown case was decided in 1983, the Court hardly
realized that it had several types of examinations which depended upon the
type of legislative body involved.'
If the body were the House of
Representatives, the strict Kirkpatrick test applied.' If the body were
a state legislature, then a more relaxed Brown rule was applied.' If the
legislative body were a local one then the Court, based on its dictum from
the Avery case, would presumably be even more willing to tolerate an
apportionment that took into account other values besides population. 95
In addition to these different 'levels of examination in traditional
86. Id. at 480 (majority opinion).
87. Id. at 476. "The Commissioner's Court is assigned by the Texas Constitution"
and as such is a statement of the majority of the legislature and state of Texas. id.

88. Id. at 487 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89. See Marbury v. Midison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Justice Marshall stated that
"[iut is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is." id. at 177.
90. See Avery, 390 U.S. at 488-90 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 486.
92. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Mahan v. Howell, 410
U.S. 315 (1973).
93. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1983). The Court in
Karcher stated that "Article I, § 2,. establishes a 'high standard . . . for the
apportionment of congressional districts .... .
Id. (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31).
94. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 326 (1973).
95. Avery, 390 U.S. at 484-85.
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apportionment controversies, the Court also applied a very different
standard of examination to another line of cases: the racial apportionment
and gerrymandering controversies. 6
Race discrimination voting controversies actually began with the
Reynolds v. Sims case.' In Reynolds, the 1964 Alabama legislature was
being controlled by the white majority who were denying blacks the
power to vote by means such as literacy tests, and poll taxes. 9 The
passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965' helped to correct the
situation. However, when Reynolds was decided, the Supreme Court was
not primarily concerned with how the Alabama Legislature had denied
blacks the vote and equal representation. " Rather, the Court was more

concerned with the fact that regions with larger populations had the same
vote in the legislature as those less poptilated.0 1 '
The "one person, one vote" rule, as it developed from Reynolds,
was clearly not concerned with the representation of minorities. " The
Court in Reynolds stated that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause demands no
less than substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens,
of all places as well as of all races.""°, However,. the rule it expounded
in that case is purely pro-majoritarian in its theory." ° Because the rule
of population-based representation is purely pro-majority, it is also by
96. For a discussion of racial discrimination in apportionment cases, see Blacksher
& Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs
Commandeered the Fifieenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1982) [hereinafter
Blacksher & Menefee].
97. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
98. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 96, at 1 n.l.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1981).
100. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964). The Court stated that the
equal protection clause establishes that representation must be.the same regardless of sex,
race, economic status or place of residence~ within a st~ie, yet only addressed the
apportionment problems and not race discrimination. Id.
101. Id. at 569.
102. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 318-30 (1973).
103. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
104. Id. The rule ensures a one-to-one relationship between the population and the
amount of seats in the legislature, thus assuring the majority of the population a control
over the vote while disregarding the needs of minorities, political or otherwise. Id.; see
also Low-Beer, The ConstitutionalImperative of ProportionalRepresentation, 94 YALE
L.J. 163, 166-67 (1984) [hereinafter Low-Beer).
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inference anti-minority. °5 Thus, the rule weakens the position of
minorities within the legislative system."' "The standards of proof
adopted by the Supreme Court have, in effect, elevated the right of

population equality created in Reynolds to a position of constitutional
primacy."" °7 For the Court "majority rule was the paramount law of the
land." 0 8 Under "one person, one vote," minority rights are clearly a

casualty.
A more recent example of the Supreme Court's method of

examination for claims of racism in voting rights controversies is the case
of City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden."°9 This case involved a class
action by black voters in the city of Mobile who alleged a dilution of their
voting rights under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and under the

enforcement provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. " ' The voters
claimed that the system .of electing members to the City Council with atlarge elections prevented blacks, who made up a 35% minority, from

electing members to the council; a fact proven by the dearth of any blacks
on that governmental body."' The city of Mobile appealed from
adverse judgments in the lower courts which found discrimination to be
present."' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellees had
not met their burden of proving that the apportionment plan was

"'conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . .

105. See id. at 163-75. The author points out that "[tiwo fundamental values
underlie the Supreme Court's debate about constitutional rights in voting: majority rule
and minority representation. The debate has taken the traditional system of winner-takeall . . . as a given." Id. at 163.
106. Blacksher& Menefee, supra note 96, at 1-14; see also Low-Beer, supra note
104, at 164-65.
107. Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 96, at 4. The authors point out that the
Court's creation of a constitutional imperative of pure majoritarian representation by
using the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments is almost hypocritical in light of the fact
that those amendments were created in order to safeguard the rights of racial minorities.
Id. The Court's rulings have "created an intolerable inversion of historical and
constitutional priorities." Id.
108. Id. at 13.
109. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
111. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 71. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that
the trial court had not only found that no black had ever been elected to the City
Commission, but that city officials were not as responsive to the needs and interests of
blacks in the community. Id.
112. Id. at 59.
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discrimination."'1

Whereas with traditional apportionment controversies, the
underrepresented voters needed to show that there was a significant
difference in the percentage of the vote between districts, 4 racial
minorities could not rely on such statistical evidence alone.115 The
Court stepped back to more relaxed levels of examination under the equal
protection clause."' Citing Washington v. Davis,"' the Court stressed
that showing a discriminatory effect, such as blacks not being elected to
any district posts, was not sufficient to support a finding of discriminatory
purpose."' For cases of voting infringement, the Court required a
The Court
showing of a racially discriminatory purpose." 9
acknowledged that the equal protection clause gives everyone the "[flight
to participate in elections on an equal basis with other qualified
voters. " "a Yet there was an unwillingness on the majority's part to
assume the infringement of that right without a showing of racist intention
The foremost reason for this high standard of
by the government.'
proof, the most strict of the apportionment examinations, is the Court's
underlying policy for the "one person, one vote" rule. That policy is to
protect majority interests at all costs to the exclusion of minority
The Mobile decision reiterates this underlying policy,
interests. 1'
stating that the "right to equal participation in the electoral process does
any 'political group,' however defined, from electoral
not protect
"
defeat. 11

VII. THE MODERN STATEMENT OF THE RULE

113. Id. at 66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971)).
114. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1968).
115. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66. In order for an apportionment scheme with

a racially discriminatory effect to be struck down, a showing of racist purpose or intent
by the legislature is necessary. Id.
116. See generally id. at 66-68.
117. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
118. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 70-71.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 77 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 576)).
121. Id. at 70-71.
122. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
123. City of Mobile, 466 U.S. at 77.
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Leaving behind the different branches of analysis, one arrives at
the modern day restatement of the "one person, one vote" rule in current

case law. The Board of Estimate case is the most up to date statement of
the "one person, one vote" rule. 12
The case was brought before the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York in 1982. '1 The case involved a an
equal protection claim by voters in Brooklyn, the most populous borough

of New York City, against the Board of Estimate. The Board has eight
members, three elected city-wide; a Mayor, a City Comptroller, and a
president of the City Council. All have the right to sit on the Board by
virtue of their election to the city governmental offices that they hold."127
The other members of the Board are the presidents of each borough;

one from Staten Island, one from Brooklyn, one from Queens, one from
the Bronx and one from Manhattan. 2 ' The district court found the
Board constitutional. ":

The district court held that the Board did not

fall under the "one person, one vote" rule because it was not an elected
legislative body."' The court based its holding on the fact that the
Board does not have elected seats. Rather, the officials who sit on the
Board are elected to represent in their districts independently and
participate in the assigned activities of the Board as part of the duties of
"Membership . . . in . . . the Board is
their respective offices."'
simply a part of the prescribed duties of the respective offices to which
124. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 551 F. Supp. 652, 656-57 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
rev'd, Board of Estimate of the City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
125. Morris, 551 F. Supp. at 652.
126. Id. at 653.
127. New York City traditionally has been composed of five boroughs. Originally
these boroughs were either cities, as in the case of Brooklyn, or counties, such as Staten
Island (formerly known as Richmond County). In 1864 these areas were joined, and
along with Manhattan, became the greater city of New York. See W. SAYRE & H.
KAuFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY 11-15 (1960).
128. When the case was decided, the borough of Staten Island had a population of
352,121; Brooklyn had 2,230,936; Queens had 1,891,325; the Bronx had 1,169,115; and
Manhattan had 1,427,533. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 831 F.2d 384, 387 (2d Cir.
1987).
129. Morris, 551 F. Supp. at 657.
130. Id. The district court stated that "the Board performs a wide variety of
None of these, however, is legislative in
executive and administrative functions ....
nature except for the Board's limited role in the annual budget process, which cannot be
decisive without the concurrent support of the city council." Id.
131. Id. at 656.
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the designated officials were already elected." 3 2
The district court further found that the executive and
administrative functions of the Board were not legislative in nature except
for the Board's limited role in the annual budget process.' 33
[T]he Board performs a wide variety of executive and
administrative functions in respect of the use of property
of, or for the City; the authorization and/or approval of
public improvements; the disposal of City property; City
planning and zoning; contracts and franchises; budgetary
and financial matters; and a miscellany of minor
matters. "4
Because the district court found that the Board is not a legislative body,
either in form or function, the Reynolds rule was not applied.' 35 The
36
court, therefore, granted the city's motion for summary judgment. 1
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded.' 37 The
court of appeals found that the members of the Board are duly elected and
do, in fact, perform legislative functions.1 38 The circuit court remanded
for fact finding on the issue of the proportionality of the representation in
the Board's membership.' 39 Interestingly, the court hinted that the
lower court may still find any malapportionment to be justifiable by a
sufficient "interest" on the part of the government, listing, among those
interests the interest of "blending majority control with minority
representation .... "140
In the first proceedings upon remand, the district court applied the
apportionment test of Abate v. Mundt '4 as stated in Flateau v.
132. Id. The district court considered the board members to be appointed rather
than elected. Id. (citing Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967)).
133. ld. at 657.
134. Id. The district court further stated that "if there were no Board, these
functions would very likely have to be performed by the same elected officials who
constitute the Board, and who indeed now make its decisions." Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 689-90.
139. Id. at 690.
140. Id. at 691.
141. 403 U.S. 186 (1971).
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Anderson.1 42
The test utilizes a formula which determines the
percentage of deviation between the districts involved. 43
"The
maximum percentage deviation is determined by adding the percentage
deviation above the population mean of the district with the greatest
number of voters to the percentage deviation below the population mean
of the district with the fewest number of voters." 1" To utilize this test
a population mean is determined between the districts and then each
district's voting power is compared to the mean to see if it is more or less
representational."
The lowest negative number is then added to the
highest to determine the maximum percentage deviation between both the
most overrepresented district and the most underrepresented district.'
The district court, applying this Abate test, but without factoring
the presence of the three at-large members, found that the maximum
deviation, between Brooklyn and Staten Island, was 132.9%. 4" This
meant that Staten Island had 75.2% more vote than it should were the
Board merely population reflective and Brooklyn had -57.7% the vote
than it would. The court then ordered further proceedings to determine
whether the deviation was justified. '"
In the subsequent proceedings, the city offered its justification for
the disparity."' The city's justifications rested on several general
142. 537 F. Supp. 257, 261 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
143. Abate, 403 U.S. at 182.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (an interesting, almost algebraic, mathematical formula, considering the
Court's warning about the utility of such numerically exacting tests).
147. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462, 1475 (1984).
148. Id.
149. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp. 1463, 1467-68 (E.D.N.Y.
1986). These reasons included:
1. Absence of any demonstrable injury
to the populations of the more heavily populated
boroughs . . . . particularly in light of the
presence on the Board of three members - the
Mayor, the Comptroller, and the City Council
President . . . [the at-large members].
2. Uniqueness of the Board as a form
of local government. . ..
3. Meaningful representation of the
citizens of the lesser populated boroughs ... in
Board affairs.
4. Preservation of the boroughs as .
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grounds. First was the fact that the Board worked, and because of that,
it was a necessary part of the government of the city. 1'0 Thus, the
underproportioned boroughs had not suffered any injury.' Second was
the need to represent the boroughs' interests in city government. 3 2
Third was the uniqueness of the Board as a "creative solution" to the
problems of local government. 53
The court dismissed these reasons as invalid," finding that
harm exists wherever there is malapportionment. 35 The mere presence
of disparity is thus taken by the court to be "harm.""; Given that the
city of New York has grown and prospered during the years since the
formation of the greater city, the court's finding of "harm" is purely
entities ....
5. Use of natural and historical
borough boundaries to define representational
entities in local government ...
9. The long standing dual role of
borough representatives as both Borough
Presidents and ... member[s] of the Board.
11. Ability to balance differing interests
and needs ....
13. Correlation between functions of
the Board and the impact of those functions upon
the boroughs ....
14. Necessity and effectiveness of
borough representation in local
government. ...
Id.
150. Id. at 1469-71.
151. Id. The city also attempted to show that the presence of the at-large members
of the Board - the Mayor, the City Council President, and the city Comptroller,
adequately represented the whole population of the city and that this negated any
numerical underrepresentation. Id. at 1468-69.
152. Id. at 1473-74.
153. Id. at 1469-70.
154. Id. at 1468-71.
155. Id. at 1468-69. "All citizens are effected when an apportionment plan
provides disproportionate voting strength .
I..." at 1468 (quoting Chapman v.
ld.
Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975)).
156. Id. at 1468-69.
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analytical. 57 The concept of uniqueness was dismissed as "unavailing"
'
The idea
because the unique nature "serves no pragmatic purpose."158
of the need for borough representation was also dismissed because it was
considered, in essence, contrary to the ideal of "one person, one
vote." 1' The court stated that the right to vote was "a citizen's right not a borough's ..... 16
Among the justifications that the court considered valid were the
historical and natural boundaries, the preservation of political
subdivisions, the effectiveness of the government, and the meaningful
representation of smaller boroughs in affairs.16' Although the court
agreed that these reasons were valid, it found that the city had failed to
show that an alternative, population-representational form of government

could not achieve these interests.162 The court thus held that the reasons
offered by the city did not justify the deviation from population reflective

apportionment and the Board, along with §§ 61 and 62 of the New York
City Charter creating it, were held to be unconstitutional. " On a
subsequent appeal, the circuit court affirmed" 6 finding that the Abate
test had been correctly applied and that the failure to include the presence
of at large members in the test was correct." The city was then given
six months to effect a change in its government.' The city appealed the
decision to the United States Supreme Court. 167 The Supreme Court

granted certiorari and in its decision on March 22, 1989, affirmed the
157. Id. The district court examined harm as defined by the Supreme Court in
previous cases and not with respect to the case before it. Id. See, e.g., Chapman v.
Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 24 (1975); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1963); Andrews
v. Koch, 528 F. Supp. 246, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), af'd, 688 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1982),
aff'd sub nom., Giacobbe v. Andrews, 459 U.S. 801 (1982).
158. Id. at 1470.
159. Id. at 1470-71, The Court stated that "[tihe one borough, one vote proposition
clashes with the one person, one vote rule. The Constitution does not mandate identical
votes for boroughs with widely disparate populations." Id. at 1470.

160. Id.
161. Id. at 1472-74.
162. Id. at 1475.
163. Id. at 1479. "[The city] must also demonstrate that no alternative plan would
satisfactorily embrace the legislative considerations and diminish deviation." Id. at 1475.
164. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 831 F.2d. 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1987).
165. Id. at 391.
166. Id. at 393.
167. Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
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circuit court decision, with Justice White writing for the majority."
The Court held that the "one person, one vote" rule was properly applied
to this form of municipal government. 11 "No distinction between
authority exercised by state assemblies, and the.., powers delegated by
these assemblies to local, elected officials, suffices to insulate the latter
from the standard of. . .voter equality."" The Court also rejected the
city's claim that the "Board of Estimate is a unique body wielding nonlegislative powers .. .
Turning to the Abate test, the Court did not agree with the Second
Circuit that the rule was properly applied with the exclusion of the "atlarge" members." The Court noted that when factoring these members
into the equation the disparity in percentage between Brooklyn and Staten
Island was 78%.1 Justice White noted that no previous case before the
Court had "indicated that a deviation of some 78% could ever be
justified." 74 As a basis for this conclusion Justice White cited the
Brown v. Thompson case,' 75 which is somewhat perplexing, as that case
found that a deviation of 89% was, in fact, acceptable. 76
In regard to the other justifications offered by the city, Justice
White deferred to the lower court's findings that these claims were not
sufficient.'" The final opinion strongly strengthens the Court's reliance
This is most accurately
on the rule of "one person one vote."'"
reflected in Justice White's statement that "[t]he personal right to vote is
a value in itself, and a citizen is, without . . . mathematically calculating
his power to determine the outcome of an election, shortchanged if he
168. Id. at 690-703.
169. Id. at 692-94.
170. Id. at 693.
171. Id. at 692.
Here
172. Id. at 701. "We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' approach .
the voters in each borough vote for the at-large members as well ... and they are also
represented by these members." Id.
173. Id. The appellees indicated that with the at large members figured into the
"equation" the difference in over-all representation was 78%. The city agreed with this
figure in oral argument. ld. at 701 n.9.
174. Id. at 702 (citing Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 846-47 (1983); Connor
v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 410-20 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 21-26 (1975);
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973)).
175. Id.

176. Brown, 462 U.S. at 846-48.
177. Board of Estimate, 489 U.S. at 702-03.
178. Id. at 693-94.
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may vote for only one representative when citizens in a neighboring
district, of equal population, vote for two . . . .'"'
This statement
demonstrates the Court's almost hypocritical view that mathematical
methods of examination should be avoided, while simultaneously applying
a mathematical test."m
In the final analysis, the Board of Estimate opinion, as the
statement of the modern "one person, one vote" rule, signaled the triumph
of numbers. The Court placed the mathematical exactness of the Abate
test above the need for legislative bodies that reflect the will of the
people."' 1 The decision of the Court in this case will have grave affects
on the many different systems of municipal governments throughout the
country." Indeed, the Court has come a far way from the "hands off"
policy of the 1940's and proceeded headlong down a rocky path into the
dangers of the "political thicket. " '183
VIII. ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE RULE
The most significant problem with the "one person, one vote" rule
is the interpretive leap that the Court made when it found a
constitutionally protected right to population-reflective legislatures;" a
rule which has been expanded not just to all state legislatures, but to every
level of local government as well.
Originally, the post-Civil War
amendments were a reaction to that war and the problems that started it:
"[t]he problems of slavery and emancipation.""
These amendments
were traditionally interpreted by the Supreme Court as limited in scope in

179. Id. at 698.
180. The Court stressed that a mathematical test would be insufficient to
demonstrate how the Board works in real life; yet it still applied the Abate mathematical
examination. Id. at 699-701.
181. Id.
182. One estimate puts the number of local governmental units at approximately
83,200. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

OF THE UNITED STATES 1990 271 (110th ed. 1990). All such units will have to
reexamine the way that they are apportioned and many more will be brought into court
under the Avery and Board of Estimate decisions. Id.; Board of Estimate of City of New
York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
183. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
184. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
185. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 408 (lth ed. 1985) (the thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments of the Constitution).
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their restriction of the power of states in only a few limited areas.8
8 7 serve as a useful example of the
The Slaughter House Cases"
limited power and intent of the fourteenth and the other post-war
amendments. In that case Justice Miller, writing for the majority, stated
that the purpose of the equal protection clause was merely to invalidate
laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes
resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and
hardship against them as a class . . . . We doubt very
much whether any action of a State not directed by way
of discrimination against negroes as a class, or on
account of their race, will ever be held to come within
the purview of this provision. "8
Justice Miller's statement proved to be incorrect. The equal
protection clause has, indeed, evolved from that limited meaning to
include discrimination of all types, including discrimination based on all
types of race, national origin and gender."8 9 The line of equal
protection cases has carved out an area of protection for traditionally
discriminated classes by recognizing that there was a basic principle
underlying the fourteenth amendment when the electorate voted upon it.
This principle was the idea that government should govern impartially,
and not on the basis of race or other arbitrary interests.'90 Few people
would argue that the acknowledgment of an underlying constitutional
principle that government must not act on the basis of race, creed or
color, or that no law may be passed by the state due to prejudice, is not
a venerable idea. It is also arguable that the framers and ratifiers of the
Constitution may have had this in mind when the amendment was passed,
186. Id. at 408-09. "mhe Court's first interpretation of the Amendments . . .
rejected the effort to give the Amendments a content going beyond the problems which
prompted them." Id.at 408.
187. 83 U.S. 36 (16 Wall.) (1872).
188. Id.at 81.
189. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42
(1985) (providing a general statement of the modem equal protection doctrine); see also
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (upholding a claim that
the all-female requirement of the state run nursing school violated claimant's fourteenth
amendment rights).
190. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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although in a limited and narrowly defined way.191
The expansion of the protection of the equal treatment principle
to preclude actions of the state based on any type of prejudice is
understandable when one acknowledges that the constitutional principles
and interpretations of today's electorate should be taken into account when
the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution. " Most modern scholars

recognize that merely relying on the original intent of the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution is, at best, a limited mode of
interpretation. "
Even if relying upon the constitutional values of the framers and
ratifiers, the Court was truly making an interpretive leap in Reynolds by
recognizing the pro-majoritarian rule of "one person, one vote. ""
"The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal
state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of
all races." 95 When examining the traditional interpretation of the equal
protection clause, it is difficult to percieve this guarantee. Examining this
difficulty from an originalist viewpoint, the Court failed to acknowledge
that in order to secure full and effective representation the Constitution
has traditionally recognized that a balance must be struck between the
rights of minorities, geographic, racial or otherwise, and the need to
protect those rights from the tyranny of the majority."
This fear of
191. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. at 81. Even Justice Miller, who penned
the majority opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, acknowledged that the post-Civil War
amendments were passed in order to ensure the freedom of blacks but that it might not
be specifically limited to this idea. Id. ("We do not say that no one else but the negroe
can share in this protection.")
192. See, e.g., Chang, Conflict, Coherence, and Constitutional Intent, 72 IOWA L.
REv. 753, 827 (1987) [hereinafter Chang]. "Thus, the equal protection clause, as
originally understood, prohibited only particular forms of discrimination against blacks
. . . . Despite this original conception . . . modem Supreme Court doctrine suggests
that any governmental action undertaken because of racial prejudice . . . is
constitutionally prohibited." Id. (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has
augmented the views of the framers and ratifiers with the "constitutional values of 'the
people' today." id. at 828.
193. id. at 796. "Thus, if courts took seriously the notion that they are permitted
to make constitutional decisions only on the basis of value determinations the framers
and ratifiers did make, or could have made, then constitutional provisions would be
progressively less relevant .... " Id. (emphasis in original).
194. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
195. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
196. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (J. Madison) (C. Rossitor, New American
Library ed. 1961).
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pure majority rule is one that James Madison had, and is a central theme
of the Federalist Papers."
It is of great importance in a republic not only to
guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but

to guard one part of the society against the injustice of
the other part .... If a majority be united by a common
interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure."I
The new government of the proposed Constitution was thought to

balance these two competing interests." 99 One way in which the right
of the majority was balanced with the interests of the minority was within

Congress.'

The new Congress had two houses, the House of

Representatives, which was population based, and the Senate, to which
two senators form each state were allotted, regardless of population. 2"
The Senate was thought to be a protection of one state's views in light of
the national electorate.'
By giving the two houses equal power in
passing laws, the Constitution also puts a check on purely population
based, or majority rule, by allowing the non-population-based body of the
Senate to thwart, in some degree, the will of the House of
Representatives.'
It is clear from Madison that in order to insure "effective" and
constitutional representation, legislatures should not be apportioned merely
on the basis of population.
The electoral college is another
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 324.
200. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 378 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter, New American
Library ed. 1961). "No law or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence,
first, of a majority of the people, and then of a majority of the States." Id.
201. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2-3.
202. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 243-44 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter, New American
Library ed. 1961).
203. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House
of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President ....
)
204. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 202, at 243-44 (J. Madison). Madison,
in stating that the adoption of the Constitution would be a "federal" act accomplished
only with the unanimous assent of all the States and not from a "decision of a majorily
of the people of the Union, nor from that of a majority of the States ...
" pointed out
that no rule that would allow a majority to dictate to a minority would be allowed in the
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manifestation of this idea in the federal system. 5 As evidenced by the
views of the framers and by the structure of the federal system itself, it
is erroneous to conclude that the Constitution embraces the idea that pure
majoritarian rule is the essence of American democracy." A situation
in which a minority's rights are overshadowed and forced to submit to the
tyranny of a majority is exactly the situation that the framers and ratifiers
foresaw and feared.'
The Supreme Court makes it difficult to address the issue of
majority rule versus minority rights in its analysis of apportionment
controversies because it fails to state its principle clearly. 2°8 The Court
seems almost to be hiding the true pro-majoritarian view that it is
espousing. The Court, in Reynolds, simply states that "every citizen has
an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political
process . . . ." The closest any of the opinions come to a statement
of the Court's underlying principles is in the Board of Estimate
decision.2 0 This statement, however, is hidden in the Second Circuit
adoption process. id. (emphasis in original).
205. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1. Under the electoral college process each state
appoints a number of electors equal to the number of representatives of that state in the
House of Representatives and the Senate. Id. During a presidential election a candidate
who wins a state by popular vote also wins that state's electors. Id. The candidate
possessing the greatest number of electors then wins the election. Id. The electoral
college procedure was put in place in order to protect the integrity of the presidency by
constructing a baffle to those who were unqualified but were popular. THE FEDERALIST
No. 68, at 414 (Hamilton) (C. Rossiter, New American Library ed. 1961). Hamilton
warned that "[tlalents for intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to
elevate a man ..... Id.
206. It is also helpful to note that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution
provided for the settlement of apportionment controversies within the Constitution itself,
leaving the power to resolve such disputes in the legislative branch. Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946). Article I of the Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for.. . Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations ..... ."U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
207. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 196, at 323-24 (J. Madison).
208. The first mention of the pro-majoritarian principle behind the rule is in Board
of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 698-703 (1989). See infra notes 210-11 and
accompanying text.
209. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
210. Board of Estimate, 489 U.S. at 698-703.
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opinion later embraced by the Supreme Court when it affirmed.2 1'
"[Tihe fact that a minority may be overshadowed by its more populous
212
neighbors . . . is one characteristic of a representative democracy."
From a modern viewpoint, ascertaining the constitutional values
or principles of today's electorate, the "one person, one vote" rule fails
to protect those values adequately. The principle that the fourteenth
amendment prohibits all governmental actions whose impetus may be
racial prejudice is not an originalist view, it is a contemporary
constitutional value.213 Yet the Supreme Court has acknowledged this
widely accepted interpretation of the Constitution. 2 .4
A rule of
representation based purely on population erodes the need to police
governmental action because of racial prejudice in the sphere of
apportionment controversies. 215 Under a pro-majoritarian rule such as
the "one person, one vote" rule, minority rights are a casualty; a system
that vindicates the rule of the majority above all cannot adequately protect
the minority. 2 6 Thus, adopting the constitutional principle that the
Constitution protects minorities from discrimination in all governmental
actions exposes the weakness and inadequacy of the "one person, one
vote" rule in protecting this principle.
In addition to the problems with the "one person, one vote" line
of cases that fail to recognize not only the true constitutional ideal of
effective representation and to define its own ideal of majoritarian rule,
the rule has other interpretive problems. The rule is weak, in an
analytical sense, because it fails to take into account a great deal of
interests that are, in most people's views, as important as the need to
reflect the will of the majority. Justice Harlan's dissent in Reynolds is an
accurate statement of the different interests, all important in their own

211. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 1983); see also
Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp. 1463, 1474 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
212. Morris. 647 F. Supp. at 1474.
213. See Chang, supra note 192, at 827.
214. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
215. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67 (1980). Where the Court
raised the standard required to show unconstitutional racial discrimination in
apportionment controversies, a showing of specific racist purpose or intent by the
legislature was required in order to find the apportionment unconstitutional. Id. This
is in sharp contrast to usual apportionment controversies involving representation
between regions in which a mere showing of unproportionality was sufficient; see also
Low-Beer, supra note 104, at 172-75.
216. See, Low-Beer, supra note 104, at 172-74.
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right, that the Court has failed to take into account. 1 7
[T]he Court declares it unconstitutional for a State to give
effective consideration to . . .(1) history; (2) 'economic
or other sorts of group interests'; (3) area; (4)
geographical considerations; (5) a desire 'to insure
effective representation for sparsely settled areas'; (6)
'availability of access of citizens to their representatives';
(7) theories of bicameralism. ..; (8) occupation; (9) 'an
attempt to balance urban and rural power.' (10) the
preference of... the State .. . . I know of no principle
of logic ...still less any constitutional principle, which
establishes all or any of these exclusions. 18
Justice Harlan correctly points out the need and importance of
these interests in bringing about "effective" representation. Apart from
these interests, the rights of racial minorities must also be considered. 1 9
The Court, however, makes it quite clear in City of Mobile that an
apportionment which has the effect of denying a racial minority
representation, is not the concern of the rule. Instead, the primary
concern is that population be correctly and mathematically reflected.'
The Court fails to recognize the fact that the problems of government and
of insuring fair representation in government are too manifold to address
with a simple numbers rule."21 The opinions espousing the "one person,
one vote" rule address the dangers of a purely numbers-based rule but fail
to follow through on the need to avoid these dangers.'m "Mathematical
. . .exactness is hardly a workable constitutional requirement."'
In
the Board ofEstimate decision, however, the Court begins its examination
by "calculating the deviation among districts," in order to determine if
"'the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any
217. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 622-23 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(quoting extensively from the majority opinion).
218. Id. (footnotes omitted).
219. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
220. Id. at 66.
221. Id.
222. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576-77.
223. Id.
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other citizen.' "'
The rule is further weakened by the undue invasion into states'
rights and the concept of federalism.'
Harlan, in his Reynolds dissent,
faced this issue when he listed "the preference of a majority of voters in
the state" as one of the concerns to which the "one person, one vote" rule
failed to give any consideration.'
The rule invades a traditional area
of state's discretion, an invasion that is most evident in the Lucas
decision.'
The Court in Lucas denied a majority of voters in
Wyoming the form of government that they chose to be the most suited
to their needs; the apportionment scheme in Lucas had actually been
approved by statewide referendum." s
The Court claimed to be
protecting the representation of the majority and ideals of democracy but
it effectively overturned the majority of Wyoming voters.
IX. SOLUTIONS
In order to solve these problems with analysis and interpretation
the Court must first more adequately define the constitutional right that it
is protecting. Next, a better and more flexible rule of examination should
be developed to insure the protection of the many interests that Justice
Harlan suggests in his Reynolds dissent.'
The traditional concept of
the protection of minorities, the widely accepted idea of a constitutional
prohibition of state action motivated by prejudice, the protection of less
populated areas from the tyranny of neighboring, more populated areas,
and historical geographic concerns are all interests that should be
protected by the court.'
The present rule lacks the necessary
definition and flexibility to insure the best possible government for the
people.
Clearly the present rule is not sufficiently responsive to the needs
of local government. If it is possible for the court to step into the local
government, as in the Board of Estimate case, and strike down an entire
224. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 701 (1989) (quoting Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
225. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 487 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
226. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 622-23 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
227. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
228. Id. at 737-39.
229. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 622-23 (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
230. Id.
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system that had worked well and had not caused any actual harm to those
who claimed to be underrepresented, ' then it is obvious that the rule
is inadequate.' 2 However, constitutional protections of some kind are
required in this area because the danger of an individual's voting power
being decreased is a real one. Many of the cases that came before the
Court involved genuine controversies in which a large electorate was
denied the vote by a minority for arbitrary or illegal purposes.3 3 Any
solution to the "one person, one vote" rule would have to be able to

prevent this type of legislative excess.'
The solution which takes into account these differing needs and
interests equitably cannot be a "hard and fast rule," nor can it be a
mathematical one, for such solutions are too arbitrary. 5 Any new rule
must be a powerful tool, powerful enough to solve real apportionment
controversies, but also be flexible so as not to upset the delicate balances
struck by local electorates.
This
A balancing test is one solution that has been offered.'
balancing solution would weigh the need for substantial equality among

231. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp. 1463, 1468-69 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
It is also best to note that Staten Island, the borough that was allegedly so powerfully
overrepresented under the Board of Estimate System, is the least populated of the five
boroughs of New York City and is regarded by many as "the forgotten borough" or as
"New York City's stepchild." Wolff, Little Island with Power Feels Weaker, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 24, 1989, at B2, col. 1. Staten Island is the only borough that has no free
access to other boroughs, there is no subway system, the city plans to build a city jail
when the Island already contains a federal prison, and many areas of the island lack
sewers and water service, as well as other basic services. Id. The many years of
overrepresentation on the Board certainly did not elevate Staten Island to any level of
ascendancy within New York.
Now that the Board of Estimate has been abolished, Staten Island has lost any
ability to prevent the more powerful boroughs from using the city government to
diminish valuable services on the Island. As this article goes to press, the city has begun
to cut back the ferry service, which is the Island's most viable public transportation link
to the rest of the city. Hoey, Ferry Riders Caught in Squeeze Demand Restoration of
Service, Staten Island Advance, July 2, 1991, at 1, col. 2. Since they lack any
mechanism within the new city government to prevent such unfair action by City Hall,
Staten Islanders can only anticipate more of the same in the near future.
232. Morris, 647 F. Supp. at 1468-69.
233. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545-50.
234. id.
235. Id. at 577. "[Glovernment would not work if it were not allowed a little play
in its joints." Id. at 577 n.1 (quoting Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501
(1931)).
236. See Note, Callfor Consistent Quantitative Standard,supra note 39, at 690-91.
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voters with the competing need for flexibility in order to protect other
valuable interests. 7 This test would allow the states' interests to be
balanced against the need to represent on a purely population-reflective
basis. The problem with this rule is that the Court has already made
forays into this area and seems unwilling to allow any interest to be
the need of population-reflective
sufficient to overcome
representation.3
Another solution is to give a clearer, less arbitrary, less
mathematic definition of the constitutional principle that is being
vindicated and to combine this new principle with a balancing test.
Instead of interpreting the Constitution as mandating that all voters must
be represented equally, the principle should be that the Constitution
requires that all persons have the same right to equally effective
representation. By interpreting the Constitution as ensuring effective and
not just population-based representation, the Court would have a more
flexible principle to work with. The Court's analysis would also be closer
to the constitutional views of the framers and ratifiers and the
This "effective
constitutional views of today's electorate.'
representation" principle would free the court from the mathematical and
arbitrary trap that it has set for itself and would allow for the concerns of
an apportionment plan that balances geographical interests, historical
At
interests, theories of bicameralism and protection of minorities.'
the very least, a rule that is flexible enough to allow the balancing of
these competing interests would prevent the Court from ignoring them as
it did in the Board of Estimate decision."'
The best method of review for this new principle would be a more
A strict
traditional analysis under the equal protection clause.' 2
scrutiny test could thus be applied to a claim of a denial of the right to
effective representation. Aprimafacie case would be made of this denial
by a showing of lack of representation in numbers, or a lack of members
237. Id. at 691.
238. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp. 1463, 1467-68 (E.D.N.Y.
1968). The city offered seventeen justifications for its deviation from population; the
court found only four to be invalid and yet still held that the remaining thirteen were not
sufficient justification. Id. at 1478.
239. See supra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
240. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 622-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
241. See generally Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
242. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42
(1985).
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of the group bringing the case serving in the legislative body. The burden
would then shift to the state to show that it is providing effective
representation. Effective representation could be proven with a showing
of an overriding state interest such as a need to adequately represent a
minority group, or the preservation of political subdivisions. 4 3 The
state would be required to show that its apportionment plan was necessary
for the purpose of achieving these ends. By placing the burden on the
state once a prima facie case is made, this new test would adequately
protect persons from having their right to effective representation denied
for arbitrary or insufficient reasons. The fact that the test would be a
balancing one weighing competing concerns would also force the Court
to acknowledge the important concerns that have traditionally been
ignored."
Setting up a balancing test which takes into account
important competing interests would also more adequately protect
minorities from a tyranny of the majority, as foreseen by the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution," 5 and would also acknowledge the
constitutional principles of the modern day in protecting the civil rights
of racial and other minorities.

X. CONCLUSION

Although no method of examination is beyond criticism, the
Board ofEstimate decision reveals the weaknesses of the "one person, one
vote" rule. The modern rule is clearly too large of an intrusion by the
judiciary into the affairs of the legislative and executive branches, and a
step into the complex "political thicket" of apportionment controversies.
A new rule, vindicating the principle of a constitutionally protected right
of equally effective representation, would allow states and legislatures
more leeway in apportionment and in securing interests other than merely
the interests of the majority, such as affirmative-action representation
plans.
This new rule would also more adequately protect racial
minorities and other traditional sufferers of prejudice, a need that has been
recognized by this court in other areas. 2' Further, a new rule would

243. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 622-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
244. Id.
245. See supra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
246. See Chang, supra note 192, at 827 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
433 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967)).
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prevent one largely populated area from exploiting and despoiling less
populated areas for its own purposes. Although it is true that members
of legislatures do not represent trees or land, nor do they represent
numbers alone. It is this fact of which the "one person, one vote" rule
is ignorant and it is this fact that requires a new rule to be created by the
Court.
Alexander D. Rosati

